This paper examines the political and technical verification issues associated with proposals to place quantitative and/or qualitative limits on the deployment of nuclear armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Overviews of the arms control relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, the development of the SLCM, and Soviet and American concepts of verification are presented. The views of the American arms control and defense communities regarding the SLCM is discussed in depth, accompanied by a detailed examination of the various methods which have been proposed to verify a SLCM limitation agreement. The conclusion is that there are no technological barriers, per se, to SLCM verification, but as the decision on an agreement"s verifiability is a political one, the U.S. Navy should concentrate its arguments against SLCM limitations on the weapon"s operational utility rather than argue that such an agreement is unverifiable. Keywords: Theses. (FR)
|Statement||by Robin Keith Myers|
|Contributions||Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||vii, 102 p. :|
|Number of Pages||102|
An illustration of an open book. Books. An illustration of two cells of a film strip. Video An illustration of an audio speaker. Political and technical verification issues of limitations on sea-launched cruise missiles Item Preview remove-circlePages: It is widely recognized that sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) are a difficult verification problem, and I am not going to present a “technical solution” to it. There is a variety of approaches which could be adopted for SLCM verification; those with the greatest advantages in terms of comprehensive monitoring also tend to have the Author: Valerie Thomas. The START Treaty will not limit long-range, nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Instead, the United States and the Soviet Union said they would make “politically binding” unilateral declarations of the numbers they intended to deploy. Since the treaty was negotiated, the United States and Russia both, by reciprocal. (4) The United States insisted that limitations on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) should not be contained in START or, therefore, be subject to START's verification provisions. The Soviet Union took a similar stand regarding the Backfire bomber, the limitations on which were also kept out of the formal Treaty and thus beyond the reach of.
Verification issues, central to previous treaty ratification debates, dominated bilateral talks about not only in terms of the technical feasibility of the potential violation, but also in terms of the probable risk, financial cost, and difficulty of the required Monitoring Limits on Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles . Dispelling myths about verification of sea-launched cruise missiles. Lewis GN, Ride SK, Townsend JS. It is widely believed that an arms control limit on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles would be nearly impossible to verify. Among the reasons usually given are: these weapons are small, built in nondistinctive industrial facilities. PART I VERIFICATION 1 Verification of Arms Control Limits on Mobile Missiles vii XI xii XV Albert Gore, Jr. 3 2 Verifying Controls on Cruise Missiles Rose Gottemoeller 17 3 Verification of ASA T Arms Control Donald L. Hafner 45 4 Stages Towards a New Test Ban Paul G. . The cruise missile is the principal innovation in U.S. weaponry in the early s. Because it is inexpensive and versatile, it is likely to be used for a wide range of military missions. At the same time, it has become a delicate issue in arms control and alliance politics. Although cruise missile programs are among the most dynamic elements in the U.S. defense buildup, their consequences 5/5(1).
Some of these concepts are examined in James P. Rubin, “Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles: Facing Up to the Arms Control Challenge,” and Herbert Lin, “Technology for Cooperative Verification of Nuclear Weapons,” both in Arms Control Today, April , pp. 2– For a more recent (and more systematic and rigorous) analysis, see the Stanford. This paper examines the political and technical verification issues associated with proposals to place quantitative and/or qualitative limits on the deployment of nuclear armed sea-launched cruise. of technical problems facing the ABM Treaty; and completed work on the impact of new technologies on strategic nuclear command, control and communications. Dr. Lin began work on a technical assessment of verification issues relating to nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles; and on the theater land-attack capabilities of the U.S. Navy. COVID Resources. Reliable information about the coronavirus (COVID) is available from the World Health Organization (current situation, international travel).Numerous and frequently-updated resource results are available from this ’s WebJunction has pulled together information and resources to assist library staff as they consider how to handle coronavirus.